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3. The question of domicil discussed, and how far that of the wife is controlled
by the husband.
4. Consideration of questions affecting the responsibility of the directors of
joint stock companies in regard to purchase of shares made by pa ties not before
shareholders; and how far directors are jusified in compromisiig claims made
upon their companies which might be successfully resisted.
5. Brief review of the case of Sufield v. Brown, affecting implied easements
in different portions of an estate, conveyed to different parties at different times.
6. How far the father is entitled to the custody of his infant child.
7. General statutory exemptions from responsibility.in common carriers.
8. At what time the title passes in contracts of sale.
9. How far knowledge of facts, acquired by the agent in other transactios,
will affect his principal.
10. How far the master is responsible for accidental injurieg resulting from
the negligence of his sewant.
11. The binding nature of parol contracts and understandings in regard to the
title of land after being executed either in whole or in part.
12. How far the owner of domestic animals, straying upon the highway, is
responsible for damage there done to persons rightfully there.
13. Upon what grounds compromises made in court and under its advice
may be set aside.

3. The vexedquestion of domicil has recently attracted a good
deal of interest before the House of Lords in England, in the
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case of Moorhouse vs. Lord, 9 Jur. N. S. B77, and in Pitt vs.
Pitt,10 Jur. N. S. 735, which last case was determined so late
as April of the present year. In the former case the court de-,
clare, that no change of residence will give a domicil in opposition to the domicil of origin, so long as there remains any purpose, however indefinite, of ever, in any contingency, returning
to the former domicil.
Lord KINGSDOWN's illustration here
was, that to an effectual change of domicil a man must intend to
become a Frenchman instead of an Englishman.
In the case of Pitt vs. Pitt, there was involved in one event,
the additional question, how far the domicil of the wife must
continue to follow that of the husband, .upon which the declarations of the Lord Chancellor were at least novel if not startling.
cc I should have had the greatest possible difficulty," said his
lordship, " in holding that the domicil of the husband was, in a
case of this kind, to be regarded in law as the domicil of the
wife, by construction or attraction, so as to compel the wife to
follow the husband and to become subject, for the purposes of
divorce, to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of any bountry which
the husband might choose, even for that purpose alone, to fix
upon and declare, that he intended to acquire a domicil." This
is probably in accordance with the American law upon the subject, where a separation, in fact, between husband and wife had
already occurred; and especially where the husband, after such
separation, proposed to select a forum for the mere purpose of
acquiring attemporary domicil as the basis ot the jurisdiction of
a suit for divorce in the courts of that forum. Nothing could be
more just and reasonable than such a doctrine within these
limits. But such a declaration upon general grounds would deprive the husband of the acknowledge right to change the common domicil, without the concurrence of the wife. The same
qte~tion has been very rebently further discussed before the'same
court in the Yelverton case.
4. The subject of the responsibility of the directors of joint
stock companies, for the effects of acts having their nominal
sanction in regard to the apparent value - of the shares of such
companies, in inducing purchases of the same, is one of considerable difficulty always: and at the present time one of great magnitude and importance in the commercial world, these companies
.having engrossed so large a share of business capital within the
last few years.
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A very curious case, illustrating this point, was brought on for
trial at the Guildford Assizes within the last few months: Bale
vs. Clelland. The question arose in this way. The auditors of
the company differed as to the true mode of drawing up the
balance-sheet. In the opinion of one of them it ought to show
a loss, while in that of the other it ought to show p profit. This
difference of opinion becoming irreconcilable, it was referred to
the decision of the shareholders at a general meeting, who naturally
enough decided in favor of the scheme showing a profit, which
resulted in declaring a dividend. The statute applicable to the
subject (19 & 20 Vict. c. 47) contains the following direction as
to dividends: cTe director8 may, with the sanction of the company in general meeting, declare a dividend to be paid to the
shareholders in proportion to their shares."
c No dividend shall
be payable except out of the profits arising from the business of.
the company." The action was withdrawn from the jury upon
a compromise between the parties, under the direction and advice
of the court, but not until the evidence had been given, and some
discussion of the questions of law before the court. Baron
MARTIN, before whom the cause was tried, gave a very decided
opinion against the directors. After repeating the general provisions of the law above quoted, the learned judge said :-" It is
the bounden duty of the directors (indeed, I do not believe the
shareholders could legally make a dividend, for it is the directors
who are to make it), it is the bounden duty of the directors,
when they declare a dividend, not to pay it except out of profits;
and if a dividend is declared otherwise than out of profits, it is
their duty to resist it and to refuse to pay it, and, if necessary,
to appeal to the Court of Chancery to resist its payment." This
is most manly and salutary counsel.
The question how far the prospectus and balance-sheet issued
by directors, and especially the latter, which is addressed exclusively to the shareholders, for their information in regard to the
true state of the company's funds, is to be considered open to
the inspection and for the information of the general public; and
how far the directors are liable for any injury suffered by any
one in consequence of buying shares, relying upon facts stated
in such prospectus and balance-sheet, was a good deal discussed
in Bale vs. Olelland, supra, and in Scott vs. Dixon, 29 L. J. Ex.
62, note, which is a similar case. In the latter case, Lord CAMPBELL)' C. J., said :-c Reports of joint stock Qompanies, though
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addressed to the shareholders, are meant for all who are likely
And his lordship adds,
to have dealings with the company."
that the report in that case was open to the inspection and purchase of all, and that the directors knew, that immediately upon
publication it would be in the hands of all the stockbrokers in
Liverpool, and would be acted upon by all who wished to have
dealings with the bank, the company in question.
This question is a good deal considered in Cullen vs. 1Tomson,
9 Jur. N. S. 85, where an action was brought in the Scottish
courts by a shareholder against the directors and the manager
and assistant manager of the Edinburgh and Glasjow Bank, on
the ground that he had been induced by their fraudulent report
to purchase shares in the bank, whereby he had suffered loss and
damage. The manager and assistant manager furnished the detailed statement issued by the directors, and were cognisant of
The
the fraudulent representations contained in the report.
Scottish courts thought that the managers, being the mere servants of the directors, were -not liable to an action for their agency
in the matter, which might be regarded as merely ministerial and
But upon appeal the House
subsidiary to that of the directors.
of Lords held, that they were personally responsible for any participation in the perpetration of a distinct fraud, and accordingly
reversed the judgment of the Scottish courts. The Lord Chancellor in giving judgment said, very justly, "No party can be
permitted to excuse himself on the ground that he acted as the
agent or the servant of another-the contract of agency or of
service cannot impose any obligation on the agent or servant to
commit or assist in the commission of a fraud."
A somewhat curious question has arisen in some late English
cases, which, we doubt not, might be raised very frequently, in
regard to the management of American companies.
In Taunton vs. The Royal Insurance Company, 10 Jur. N. S.
291, a bill was brought by a shareholder, on behalf of himself
and all the other shareholders except the defendants, against the
directors and the company, to obtain a declaration that funds applied by the directors in the adjustment of losses not strictlywithin the liabilities of the company, had been misapplied. It
appeared that all losses from explosion, except of gas, were expressly excepted from the policies of the company. An explosion of gunpowder occurred, causing considerable damage to
houses insured by the company, and the directors, as matter of
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policy and to avoid clamor, but expressly protesting against all implication of obligation to do so, resolved to pay such losses, and
did pay them. This course was approved by a majority of the
shareholders, and had been followed by other insurance companies,
and was the usual course pursued by such companies. The ViceChancellor, Sir W. P. WooD, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought. The risk was within the powers of the
company to insure against, and was analogous to those actually
insured against, and the course pursued was indispensable to the
credit and good standing of the company, and clearly for their
interest and necessarily for the benefit of the shareholder. The.
court held it to be within the reasonable discretion of the directors of the company, in the prudent and proper management of
its concerns. A similar decision was made in the case of SimpBon vs. The Westminster Palace Hotel Company, 6 Jur. N. S.985, s. c., 6 Jur. N. S. 764; Id. 747. But the decision was
dissented from by Lord Justice TURNER, in the Court of Chancery Appeal. It seems to have gone upon the ground that the
acts complained of were for the furtherance of the general purposes of the association, and that courts of equity will not therefore restrain them, although not strictly within the terms of the
charter of the company, or at all events not obligatory upon the
directors.
We need scarcely add, that unless such cases are regarded as
falling within the range of that somewhat numerous class of matters pertaining to the management of joint stock companies,
which are submitted to the private and personal discretion of the
directors, and which the courts will not condescend to interfere
with, on account of the multiplicity and inferiority of such matters, according to the maxim de minimis lex non curat; unless,
we say, these cases are to be referred to that category of cases,
which are too minute and too insignificant to call for the supervision of the court, like the-management of the minor offices and
non-essential expenditures of the company, we should certainly
hesitate to subscribe to the doctrines implied in their determination. We can comprehend why a court of equity might decline to
assume the control of the general and minute detail of the bdsiness
of a joint stock company; but upon any other ground, except of
its minuteness and insignificance, it is difficult to see how the courts
could feel justified in declaring that the directors of a corporation
could be justified in paying out the funds of the company in the
purchase of popularity, or by way of blackmail, or even in buy-
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ing peace, except in cases confessedly doubtful. A natural
person may do so, undoubtedly, and act wisely; but an agent or
trustee certainly has not, ordinarily, any such discretion : and it
would, as it seems to us, be a new and dangerous element to
introduce into the discretion of persons standing in fiduciary relations. We cannot but feel that there is great wisdom and justice
in the dissent expressed by Lord Justice TURNER.
5. The doctrine of implied easements and servitudes, growing
out of erections upon adjoining lots, and the erection of blocks
of buildings for a common purpose, has been considerably discussed in the English courts of late, but efihbraces too extensive
a range of topics to be here discussed at length. But a very
curious question of analogous character arose in Suffield vs.
Brown, 9 Jur. N. S. 999, in regard to the implied right of use
continuing the same as it had existed before, after the severance
of ownership, without any express reservation. This was the case
of a dock and wharf owned by the same party, where the bowsprits of vessels in the dock had to project over the corner of
the wharf in order to enter the dock, if they were of any considerable size. The wharf was sold to one, without any reservation of the right claimed, and the dock to another. The bowsprits of vessels continued to be run over the edge of the wharf
for a time, after the severance, when the owner of the wharf proposed to make such erections as would interrupt that use, and the
question was brought before Sir J. RomILLY, M. R., who decreed
infavor of the right to continue such easement as being necessary
to the f ill and reasonable enjoyment of the dock. The learned
judge said, in giving judgment :-" If, therefore, it be true that
the dock can still be used, it is equally true that it cannot be used
exactly as it has been heretofore; and my opinion is, that this
projection is necessary to the due enjoyment of the dock, in the
ordinary sense of that term. What is meant by the use of that
word in these and analogous cases is, in my opinion, the full and
complete use of the tenement, as it stands, when the joint owner
of the two adjoining tenements grants one of them to one person,
and the other to another;" citing JRincheliffe vs. The Earl of Kin
noul, 5 Bing. N. 0. 1, 25; Pryer vs. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916.
But when the case came before the Lord Chancellor on appeal,
10 Jur. 111, the doctrine of the case of Pryor vs. Carter was dissented from and the decree of the Master of the Rolls reversed,
upon the ground that mere knowledge of the manner in which pro-
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perty conveyed was used by the vendor for the convenience of an
adjoining tenement, will not affect the purchaser, if the property
is conveyed without reservation,, and the continuance of the
former use is not indispensable. His lordship's opinion is somewhat diffuse, not to say rambling, and although doubtless sound
in the main proposition already stated, contains much disquisition which is either irrelevant or unsound. The case of Pryor
vs. Carteris a sound case, unquestionably, and has been always
so regarded, but not decisive upon the question before the court.
The true principle upon which all such cases should turn, no
doubt, is, whether the continuance of the existing use is indispensable to the future enjoyment of that portion of the premises
reserved, so that the purchaser of the portion first conveyed, as
a reasonable man, must be presumed to have taken his conveyance with the expectation that such use would be thereafter continned the same as before; if so, thb continuance of the use
becomes by the assent of the purchaser an implied servitude upon
the portion conveyed, which a court of equity will enforce by
perpetual injunction; otherwise not.
The decision of the Lord Chancellor, in Suffield vs. Brown,
and especially in disregarding, and, as far as lay in his power,
overruling the case of Pryor vs. Carter, has been strenuously
dissented from by the bar in England; and we anticipate that
the obiter dictaof his lordship will not be generally regarded as law,
either there or here, although his decision of the particular case,
and the grounds upon which it is placed, may be considered sound.
The truth is that his lordship is not so much of a lawyer as an
advocate; and although he is sometimes right in his conclusions
upon the particular case, he is generally more or less wrong in
the speculations and reasons by which he attempts to fortify and
defend his decisions."
The rule of law upon the subject of implied easements is, no
doubt, correctly laid down by WILDE, B., in Dodd vs. Birchall,
8 Jur. N. S. 1180, 1 H. & C. 113, in these words :WThere a man
has used his premises in a certain way for some time, and it can be
brought home to the knowledge of the purchaser, the conveyance
may be supposed to be made with an intention of reservation on the
part of the grantor, and the land passes subject to such a use."
The case of Pryor vs. Carter is 'quoted as correctly laying down
'London Jurist, Feb. 27, 1864, leading article.
March, 1864.
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the law, by Lord CAMPBELL, Chancellor, in the House' of Lords,
in -Ewart-vs. Cochrane, 7 Jur. N. S. 925, so late as 1861, where
the rule of law is thus stated in the opinion of the court.
"cWhere two properties are possessed by the same owner, and
there has been a severance made of part from the other, any
thing which was used, and was necessary for the comfortable enjoyment of that part of the property which was granted, must
be considered to follow from the grant." The only possible
distinction between this proposition and the case of Pryor vs.
Carter, consists in the fact that in one case the implied easement
is attached to the portion first conveyed, and in the other it
attaches to the portion reserved; in other words, the distinction
consists in the difference between the construction of a grant and
a reservation. This distinction has long since become practically
obsolete in the law, except that in a case precisely equally
balanced in point of construction, between the grantor and
grantee (a contingency which seldom or never occurs), the equipoise is determined in favor of the grantee. It is idle, at the
present day, to claim that any essential distinction between the
construction of a grant and a reservation can be maintained.
We conclude, therefore, that such a point, not even alluded to
by the House of Lords in a case where it existed, and was decisive of the question in judgment, if adhered to, will not be held
of serious weight: and that Pryor vs. Carter, and the doctrines
built upon it, will still be held sound until overruled by the
same court which declared them, that being the highest court in
the land.
There are so many other points in the recent English decisions
which we had marked for consideration, that we can only allude
to them in the briefest manner.
6. We refer to a late decision in the court for divorce and
matrimonial causes, in regard to the right of the father as against
the mother to the custody of his infant child. The English
courts seem disposed to adhere to this rule of the common law
with great strictness, not to say pertinacity. In the case referred
to, Cartledge vs. Cartledge, 81 L. J. P. M. & A. 84, the rule was
carried to the extent of ordering an infant seven, months old
given to the father. By the English statute this court have a
discretionary power, in regard to the custody of children pending a litigation between the parties for divorce in any form, or
upon any kindred suit. But the judge here held, that in order
to justify the mother in claiming the custody of her children as

IN ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE.

against the father, she "must establish something more than her
maternal rights." It was admitted in this case, that although
the mother was not absolutely nursing the child, she was in every
sense the most suitable person to have the custody of it, but the
case was decided upon the superior right of the father above
that of the mother to the custody of his children. The question
is considered by Vice-Chancellor KIND RSLEY, In re Curtis, 28
L. J. Ch. 459, where it was held that in order to take the custody of an infant child, incapable of exercising a discretion upon
the subject, from the father, it was requisite to show that he was
in such a perverted state of mind or morals, or entertained such
religious opinions, that he would be likely to inculcate such views
upon the minds of his children as to be seriously detrimental to
them in after life as members of society; or that he treated them
with such severity or cruelty as to be wholly unfit to have the
custody of them.
This rule of the English courts does not, however, extend beyond the period of the child's discretion to choose between the
parents ; which period, to avoid contests, has been fixed 'by the
English courts at the age of fourteen: Alicia Bace, 26 L. J. Q.
B. 169; Hyde vs. Hyde, 29 L. J. P. M. & A. 150.
We cannot forbear to say, that in our judgment, the rule
which is now very generally established in the American States,
of giving the custody of children, below the age of discretion,
to the parent that upon the whole seems most suitable to exercise the custody, is the most just and reasonable rule upon the
subject, always giving the father the preference, other things being equal. The rule of the common law which recognises the
superior rights of the husband as to all matters pertaining to the
control of the family, while the parents continue to live together,
has not the same reasons of necessity or convenience in its
favor after they become separated. The courts may then fix the
custody of the children as they think will most conduce to their
careful training, education, and comfort, without the violation of
any rule affecting quiet and good order in families: a right
which is now generally secured in the American States, either by
custom or statute, but not in all, we are sorry to say.
7. In the case of Hodgman vs. The WVest Midland Railway
Conmpany, 10 Jur. N. S. 673, Jan. 1864, the extent of the
responsibility of common carriers for the transportation of live
animals as freight, and for accidents while upon their premises,
and before they are regularly billed and the freight paid, and
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how far general exemptions from responsibility will attach, is
elaborately discussed and the rule declared that such exemptions
attach from the first connection of the carrier -with the property,
the Lord Chief Justice dissenting.
8. The precise point of the finality and of the passing of the
property in a contract of sale, was extensively discussed in Turley vs. Bates, 10 Jur. N. S. 868, April, 1864, and the doctrine
declared that the rule that no property passes, where by one of
the terms of the contract, anything remains to be done to the
subject-matter of the contract, does not apply where it appears to
have been the intention of the parties that the property should
pass notwithstanding. And it is here suggested that this rule
never applies, unless something remains to be done by the seller.
How far these declarations of the Court of Exchequer will be
adopted by the courts of last resort, it is impossible to say; but
we cannot forbear to suggest the very obvious conclusion that
the simplicity and perspicuity of the rule of law, upon this vexed
question, is certainly very much increased by, the doctrine and
the intimations here put forward.
9. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, in the very late case of
Dresser vs. Norwood, 10 Sur. N. S. 851, June, 1864, adopted a
rule in regard to the effect of knowledge in the agent acquired
in other transactions than those belonging to his agency, and
how far such knowledge will affect the principal, which will be
regarded as a very important qualification of the former rule
upon that subject, viz.: That the knowledge of an agent is the
knowledge of his principal, and the principal is affected by it,
whether acquired by the agent in the course of his employment
as such, or otherwise. This opinion of this high court of error,
in which, by a unanimous judgment, the decision of the Court of
Common Pleas, 10 Jur. N. S. 23, is reversed, cannot fail to impress the profession with the expectation that the new doctrine
in the law of agency thus declared will be likely to be adhered
to. We cannot but regard this as an- important advance in'the
right direction. It is a view of the responsibility of the principal for the act and the good faith of his agent, which we cannot
but rejoice to see adopted by so dignified and learned a tribunal;
one which, in our humble way, and in a narrower sphere, we
labored most earnestly to vindicate and to recommend in the
case of .Fitzsimmons vs. Joslin, 21 Vt. R. 129, and in Hart vs.
Farmers' Af. Bank, 33 Vt. R. 252. In the latter of these
cases the rule declared is almost precisely identical with that
'
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declared by the English Court of Exchequer Chamber, viz.:
That if an attorney receive notice that the person holding the
record title of land is not the real owner, but merely a trustee,
one who subsequently employs the same attorney to attach and
levy upbn the land as the property of the trustee, will be affected
by the attorney's knowledge of the true state of the title, though
not communicated to him before the attachment. This declaration of the Supreme Court of Vermont was, not without reason,
regarded at the time as a very important departure from the
former rule of law. We are not so simple as to suppose that
our own views could, by possibility, have influenced the result to
which the English courts have finally arrived; nor is the coincidence so novel as to impress us with any surprise, having experienced similar coincidences many times before; but we feel at
liberty to express our gratification, because it is a great advance,in a very essential point, towards the recognition of the principle that good faith and fair dealing is the only ultimate basis of
all the doctrines of the old common law of England and America.
And we confess als o to some willingness to afford the American
bench, especially those of them who feel any painful sense of
reluctance at the adoption of any principle, however strongly
recommended by its sense of justice and right, provided it do
not also come recommended by an express decision in its favor,
or, what is more appalling to a mind perplexed with doubt and
-uncertainty, when it runs counter to a long course of judicial
determinations; we feel desirous of affording such, if any such
there be, a palpable illustration of the old maxim, that truth is
mighty, and that we are always safe when we are clearly following in its train: magna est veritas, et 7erwvalebit. But we should
be sorry to be misunderstood, as in any sense urging a bold and
defiant attitude in regard to the established course of judicial decisions. Nothing could be further from our wishes. It is only
in extreme cases, and where there is no room for doubt, that the
former course of judicial decision can be with safety disregarded,
and in such a case there should never be any hesitation. We are
glad also of this opportunity of stating a fact which is most undeniable, 'but not generally understood, perhaps, that the American bench are far more slavishly bound down to the authority of
precedents, and feel far less liberty, so to speak, to walk upright
and to regulate their course by an adherence to principle, than
do the English judges. Inferior courts everywhere, as matter
of taste as well as duty, must bow to the force of authority.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

But the courts of ultimate authority labor under no such embarrassment; and it must result either from want of perception or
want of courage, when a'jalpable disregard of the clearest principle, truth and justice, is maintained out of the most subservient and unquestioning deference to the authority of former precedents, however strictly in point.
10. There iq a somewhat interesting question in regard to the
responsibility of the master for the act of his servant, determined
in the case of Woodman vs. Joiner, 10 Jur. N. S. 852, that
where the plaintiff permitted the defendant to use his shed for
doing a piece of carpentering, and the carpenter employed by
the defendant, in lighting his pipe, set the shed on fire, that the
defendant was not liable in any action for negligence. The court
say :-" We have had much doubt upon this question, but have
&,If
the
all arrived at the conclusion that there is no liability."
servant had been guilty of any negligence relating to his employment, it may be that the defendant would have been liable."
It seems to us very obvious, that the master cannot be, held liable
in such a case unless guilty of some negligence himself in the
employment of improper servants, or of improperly continuing
them in service after becoming aware of their want of proper
carefulness, or unless the servant does an injury, by negligence
or wilfulness, in the course of his employment, whereby he becomes liable to his employer, in which case the defendant may
be held directly responsible to the owner of the shed, because
there is no privity between him and the defendant's servant.
11. In the case of Thornton vs. Ram8den, 10 Jur. N. S. 839,
May, 1864, the question how far the owner of land is bound by
parol contracts and understandings with lessees, who make erections of a permanent nature upon the faith of such understandings growing out of the customary management of the estate,
and whether such contracts are enforceable in courts of equity,
came before Vice-Chancellor STUART, and was extensively discussed, and the binding nature and force of such contracts and
The case is valuable, as well.
understandings fully maintained.
for the elaborate and learned review of the authorities, as for itsfull vindication of this important branch of equity jurisprudence.'
12. The case of Cox vs. Burbridge, 9 Jur. N. S. 970, January, 1863, where it was held, that the owner of a horse, which
strays upon the highway and there kicks a child, lawfully in the
highway, is not responsible, unless it appear that the owner was
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aware that the horse was likely to commit such an act, has created some discussion in England, and provoked some unfriendly
criticisms, and as it seems to us, not altogether without reason.
It seems almost incomprehensible that any ope should require
proof that the owner of a horse was made aware of its propensity
to do damage when running at large in the highway. If the
horse was wrongfully in the highway, and did damage in consequence to any person or thing rightfully there; the owner or
keeper should be responsible, as it seems to us.
13. The case of Stainton vs. The Carron Company, 10 Jur.
N. S. 783, in the House of Lords, July, 1864, before the Lords
Justices, 7 Jur. N. S. 645, and before Sir JOHN RoMILLY, M. R.,
6 Jur. N. S. 360, involves an important question, in all its bearings,
especially in regard to the binding effect of a compromise between the parties made in court and under its advice. The House
of Lords, by the mouth of the Lord Chancellor, declare, that
the compromise was not binding when the cause of action grows
out of the .ffaud of one party, which, although not known, was
'suspected by the other party before the compromise. Of the
truth of this proposition we should not be disposed to raise any
question. The only doubt which occurs to us in regard to the
propositions maintained by the opinion in the House of Lords is,
as to a point where the Lord Chancellor somewhat censoriously
presents an extended criticism upon the form in which the Lords
Justices required the decree before them to be drawn up, as being altogether uncalled for. The minute explanation of the
point would carry us beyond our limits. It turned upon the
effect of a decree of the Court of Chancery, upon a bill for an
account between parties, from the year 1808 forward, where the
decree was limited to the accounts subsequent to the year 1825,
and the subsequent suit was for matters earlier than 1825. The
Lords Justices regarded it important to take the admission of
the parties that the last suit should be treated, as supplemental
to the former, while the Lord Chancellor held that the latter
suit was maintainable as a wholly independent suit. It seems very
obvious to us, upon any recognised rule of decision, that the account was one entire thing; and if so, it is equally clear that
successive suits for different portions of it cannot be maintained,
and, by consequence, that the former adjudication would form a
bar to any other suit except as supplemental to the former one.
There are one or two other matters to which we would gladly
I. F. R.
allude here, but our space will not allow.

